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UNSHACKLING SHAWANNA: THE BATTLE OVER CHAINING
WOMEN PRISONERS DURING LABOR AND DELIVERY

Elizabeth Alexander*
I. INTRODUCTION

On October 2, 2009, in Nelson v. CorrectionalMedical Services,' the
en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued a historic decision, becoming the first federal appellate court to hold that the law
is "clearly established" that shackling a woman prisoner during labor and
delivery, in the absence of a clear security justification for such restraints,
violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by imposing cruel and unusual punishment. 2 The court of appeals accordingly reversed the panel decision and remanded for trial the claims against the correctional officer who shackled the plaintiff, Shawanna Nelson.3 This article
describes the history of that litigation, its significance for the cause of protecting the health and dignity of women prisoners during pregnancy, as well
as its general significance for protecting prisoners from restraint practices
that brutalize them. The article also suggests some broader implications of
the Nelson decision.

* Elizabeth Alexander argued Nelson v. CorrectionalMedical Services, 583 F.3d 522
(8th Cir. 2009) (en banc), the case condemning the routine shackling of women prisoners in
labor, discussed in this article. She would particularly like to thank Shawanna Nelson, who
went through more than many of us can imagine, and who pursued this case to prevent other
women from being subjected to such shackling. In addition, Ms. Alexander would like to
thank Amy Fettig, staff lawyer at the National Prison Project, Diana Kasdan from the Reproductive Freedom Project, and Cathi Compton, who served as Ms. Nelson's counsel from the
beginning, for their tireless efforts in obtaining justice in the litigation described in this article.
1. 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
2. Id. at 532-33.
3. Id. at 536.
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II. THE STRUGGLE OVER SHACKLING PRIOR To NELSON

The last several years have seen a burgeoning movement to end the
practice of shackling pregnant women prisoners, particularly during labor
and delivery. Advocates cite medical opinion condemning the practice as
dangerous to the woman and the child she hopes to bear because women in
labor need to be able to change their position freely.4 Shackling to a bed or
other stationary object is also dangerous to women in labor because of the
possibility that unexpected emergencies may require that the women be
moved to a delivery room without the delay caused by the need to unlock
and remove shackles. 5 The practice is also intrinsically undignified and humiliating.6 It is particularly dangerous to the mental health of women in
prisons because such women frequently have serious histories of sexual and
physical abuse that have already traumatized them.7 Survivors of sexual
trauma are at high risk for a variety of symptoms typical of post-traumatic
stress disorder, including feelings of powerlessness, low self-esteem, and a
pervasive sense of personal defilement. As a result, some survivors are
constantly on46alert" for the threat of renewed trauma.8
Despite the well-known risks of shackling women prisoners and detainees during labor and delivery, it was not until 2000 that Illinois became the
first state to pass legislation to limit this practice. 9 Since that time, six additional states have restricted shackling by statute and other states have
adopted administrative policies in the last few years that have limited, to
varying degrees, the shackling of women prisoners during labor and delivery.' ° Often the change has come after media coverage of a particular inci4. Amnesty International USA, Fact Sheet: Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/violence-against-women/abuse-of-women-in-custody/fact-sheetshackling-of-pregnant-prisoners/page.do?id=1 108308 (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) [hereinafter
Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners]; see also Letter from Ralph Hale, Executive Vice President,
Am. Coll. of Gynecologists & Obstetricians, to Malika Saada Saar, Executive Dir., The
Rebecca
Project
for
Human
Rights
(June
12,
2007),
available at
http://www.acog.org/departments/underserved/20070612SaarLTR.pdf.
5. Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. Women in Prison Project, Corr. Ass'n of N.Y., Survivors of Abuse in Prison Fact
Sheet (Apr. 2009), http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publications/download/
wipp/factsheets/Suvivors of AbuseFactSheet_2009_FINAL.pdf; ACT 4 Juvenile Justice,
Fact Sheet: Girls and Juvenile Justice, http://act4jj.org/media/factsheets/factsheet_29.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2010).
8. Erwin R. Parson & Luerena K. Bannon, Stress Responses in Sexual Trauma Victims
and in Others Experiencing Overwhelming Events, GIFT FROM WrrHIN, 2004, at 6,
http://www.giftfromwithin.org/pdf/strategy.pdf.
9. Movement Builds to Stop Shackling PregnantPrisoners,THE CRIME REPORT, AUG.

31, 2009, http://thecrimereport.org/2009/08/3 1/movement-builds-to stop-shackling-pregnantprisoners [hereinafter Movement Builds].
10. Id. See also Jennifer Sullivan, Gregoire Signs Bill Barring Shackling of Pregnant
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dent highlights the harm caused by the use of shackles, as well as the lack of
need for such restraint during labor and delivery.
California's enactment of legislation, for example, came after media
coverage in 2005 of the experience of Desiree Callahan, confined at the San
Joaquin Valley Prison. Amnesty International, which compiles accounts of
women shackled during labor and childbirth, notes that Ms. Callahan was
rushed to a hospital with her ankle chained to a gurney. Her baby daughter
died after an emergency Caesarian, and for most of the next four days in the
hospital Ms. Callahan was reportedly shackled to her bed. Ms. Callahan
described the restraints as "humiliating" and reported that the restraints interfered with her recovery from the traumatic delivery: "You have to be
stuck to a bed even though the doctors say you need to get up and walk because your stomach was cut open."' 2 In January 2006, California enacted a
statute banning the shackling of prisoners after arrival at the hospital for
labor and delivery "unless deemed necessary for the safety and security of
the inmate, the staff, and the public."' 3
The New York legislature recently banned the practice of shackling
prisoners during labor and delivery. The reform bill passed the New York
Assembly on September 30, 2009,14 following news reports of the consequences of requiring pregnant prisoners and detainees to go through labor
and even give birth in shackles. The New York Times, for example, described the experiences of Venita Pinckney, a prisoner who was shackled
with a chain twice around her waist, handcuffs, and ankle shackles. 5
At least once a week, somewhere in one of New York's prisons or jails,
a pregnant women [sic] goes into labor. Nearly all of them, including
Ms. Pinckney, are behind bars for drug offenses. Even so, they are often
as severely restrained in the final hours of pregnancy as the most nimble
and dangerous of criminals. While their bodies heave toward childbirth,
they become walking, clanking jail cells. 16
The other five states regulating by statute the use of restraints on women prisoners during labor are California, New Mexico, Texas, Vermont, and
Inmates, Seattle Times, March 23, 2010 [hereinafter Bill Signed], available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2011421494_restraints24m.html.
11. Amnesty International USA, California Women in Prison, Custodial Sexual Misconduct, http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/custody/states/california.pdf (last visited Mar.
1,2010).
12. Id.
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (West 2005); see also Adam Liptak, Prisons Often
Shackle Pregnant Inmates in Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/national/02shackles.html?_r1l.
14. B. A9168 2009-2010 Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009)
15. Jim Dwyer, Giving Life, Wearing Shackles and Chains, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009,
at MB 1, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/nyregion/12about.html.
16. Id.
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Washington.17 At least six additional states, as well as the District of Columbia, the United States Marshals Service, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, limit the practice of shackling women during labor and delivery by
written policy.' 8 Ten other states report that their practice is not to use restraints during labor and delivery.' 9 Nonetheless, the survey demonstrates
that a majority of jurisdictions, at best, lack clear policies prohibiting shackling during labor and delivery. Thus, while shackling women during labor
and delivery could easily meet a layperson's description of "cruel," such
shackling has not been at all "unusual" in America's prisons and jails.

III. SHAWANNA NELSON'S ORDEAL
A.

The McPherson Unit

In June 2003, Shawanna Nelson entered the Arkansas Department of
Correction and was assigned to the McPherson Correctional Unit in Newport, Arkansas. 20 In November 2003, the United States Department of Justice issued a report on McPherson that concluded that the prisoners confined
there were subjected to "deliberate indifference towards their serious medical needs.",2 1 Significantly, among the specific findings of the Department of
Justice were that the facility violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution in failing to provide minimally acceptable treatment with regard to
emergency care, necessary staffing, proper supervision of staff, and in failing to implement written medical policies consistently.22
The findings letter noted that prisoners with serious medical conditions
were often not referred to a doctor or hospital in a timely manner, and it
gave an example in which a McPherson prisoner with chest pains and elevated blood pressure was sent back to her dormitory by a nurse without a
referral to the physician. 23 Another prisoner, who was diagnosed with asth17. See Movement Builds, supra note 9; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 801a (2006)
(providing that pregnant prisoners shall not ordinarily be restrained after the first trimester of
pregnancy). Interestingly enough, when surveyed about its shackling practices, the Vermont
Department of Corrections stated that it does not know of any statute restraining shackling of
pregnant prisoners. Movement Builds, supra note 9. See also Bill Signed, supra note 10.
18. Movement Builds, supra note 9.
19. Id.
20. Arkansas Department of Correction, Shawanna Nelson Grievance Statement at 2
(Sept. 29, 2003) (on file with author).
21. Letter from R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney General, to Mike Huckabee,
Governor
of
Arkansas
at
1
(Nov.
25,
2003),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/mcphersongrimes-findinglet.pdf
[hereinafter
Letter to Gov. Huckabee]. McPherson was built and initially operated by a private prison
company, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, until 2001 when the state assumed its operation. Id. at 2.
22. Id.at 4.
23. Id.at 10.
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ma and HIV infection, had complained of chest pains and shortness of
breath but was not seen for two days.24 When the patient was finally seen,
her vital signs were abnormal. Nonetheless, the nurse waited an additional
twelve hours to send her to the hospital with a diagnosis of pneumonia.25
After the patient was hospitalized, she was diagnosed with a potentially
fatal opportunistic infection associated with HIV infection.26
The findings also included numerous cases in which McPherson prisoners had not received adequate follow-up care from a specialist.27 In fact,
one of the specific recommendations from the Department of Justice was
that McPherson needed to "ensure that inmates with special medical needs
' 28
are promptly scheduled for and transported to outside care appointments.
Another recommendation was that the use of a restraint chair, in which prisoners are mechanically restrained in a sitting position, be restricted to "appropriate circumstances. 2 9
McPherson shared one full-time physician with another prison, Grimes
Correctional Unit, also in Newport, Arkansas.30 That physician, however,
spent much of her time on administrative matters. 3' The Department of Justice also concluded that McPherson failed to adequately protect prisoners
from harm because of lapses in supervision of staff and prisoners, violations
of the privacy of prisoners, and substandard investigations of incidents of
possible misconduct, which "create[d] an atmosphere conducive to misconduct and abuse." 32 The findings letter noted at least thirteen reported incidents of sexual misconduct or abuse at McPherson and Grimes.3 3 The letter
also criticized McPherson based on the discovery of prisoner grievances
complaining of retaliation from correctional officers that were never investigated.34 The findings letter led to a subsequent agreement between the
Department of Justice and Arkansas, under which the state agreed, among
other things, to "provide on-site physician coverage to ensure the supervision of nursing staff;" to ensure that "inmates with special medical needs
are appropriately scheduled for and transported to outside care appointments;" to ensure that "outside treatment recommendations are followed as
correctional officer staffing
clinically indicated;" and to "provide adequate
35
and supervision to ensure inmate safety.,
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10-11.
Letter to Gov. Huckabee, supra note 21, at 11.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 1, 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 23.
Letter to Gov. Huckabee, supra note 21, at 23.
Id. at 26.
Memorandum of Agreement from the Dep't of Justice to the State of Ark. 3-5 (Aug.
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At the time that Ms. Nelson entered the prison, Arkansas had various
policies regulating the use of mechanical restraints on prisoners. Most significant among them was Administrative Regulation 403, which permitted
the use of leg irons as well as handcuffs and security belts to transport prisoners within a prison but did not specifically address the issue of the type of
restraints to be used in transporting prisoners outside the perimeter of the
prison.3 6 The Administrative Regulation provides guidance of the most general sort: restraints are to be used to "prevent escape, assault, or the commission of some other offense by violent or disruptive offenders" and to
"protect employees, offenders, and other individuals. 37 There is also a 1995
Administrative Directive that indicates that all prisoners transported to or
from a prison must be handcuffed and that prisoners being transported from
maximum security may also be subjected to leg irons. 38 In short, the policies
of the Department of Correction are unclear but appear to give tremendous
discretion to the correctional officer who is in charge of the transport, including discretion that allows the correctional officer to decide whether to
use leg shackles in a hospital on a woman in active labor.
There was also a local policy related to restraining prisoners transported for medical care. McPherson Unit is part of the Newport Complex
within the Department of Correction, and thus correctional officers at
McPherson were also governed by the Newport Complex Hospital Security
Post Order. 39 That post order provides in relevant part as follows:
1. Restraints will not be removed unless the doctor advises it for medical
reasons. In that event, the Warden/designee will be contacted for approval.
2. If handcuffs are to be removed, leg shackles will be secured before
removing the wrist restraints.
3. Pregnant inmates in the final stages of labor will not be restrained
while in the delivery room giving birth, or at any time the physician in
charge determines that such application would be a health risk to the unborn child or the health of the inmate.
B. All inmates, regardless of Class[ification], will be restrained with
handcuffs. One (1) or more of the following restraints will also be used,
if warranted:

27, 2004), availableat http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/split-mcpherson-agree_
8_27 04pdf.
36. Use of Restraints, Ark. Admin. Reg. 403 (Feb. 28, 1992) (on file with author).
37. Id. at 1.
38. Admin. Directive 95:21, at 2 (Oct. 20, 1995) (on file with author).
39. Arkansas Department of Correction, Newport Complex, Hospital Security Post
Order (Aug. 1, 2003) (on file with author).
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1. Waist chain/security belt
2. Leg shackles
NOTE: All restraints will be double-locked.

40

The post order accordingly gave correctional officers general authority
not to require a pregnant prisoner to be restrained using leg shackles, except
when the handcuffs were removed and there was no medical order restricting the use of shackles.
B.

Ms. Nelson's Labor and Delivery

Shawanna Nelson entered the Department of Correction on June 3,
2003, following convictions for credit fraud and writing checks with insufficient funds.4 ' On September 20, 2003, she experienced labor pains and a
correctional officer sent her to the prison infirmary.42 The infirmary nurse
sent her back to her barracks on the ground that her contractions were still
six to seven minutes apart. When Ms. Nelson returned to the infirmary, the
nurse again declined to send Ms. Nelson to the hospital for delivery although her contractions were by then recurring at five to six minute intervals.43 A correctional officer ultimately insisted that Ms. Nelson be taken to
a hospital. 44
Correctional Officer Patricia Turensky escorted Ms. Nelson to the outside hospital.45 Ten minutes after Ms. Nelson arrived at the hospital, Ms.
Nelson's cervix was dilated to seven centimeters.4 6 When the cervix dilates
to approximately eight centimeters, the woman is nearing the end of active
labor and transitioning to delivery of her baby.47 Nonetheless, Officer Turensky placed both of Ms. Nelson's legs in shackles. 48 Every time Ms. Nel40. Id. at 2.
41. Shawanna Nelson Grievance Statement, supra note 20, at 1; Nelson v. Corr. Med.
Servs., No. 1:04-cv-00037-JMM-JWC (E.D. Ark. June 11, 2007), Deposition of Shawanna
Nelson at 8 (Feb. 8, 2006) (on file with author).
42. Deposition of Shawanna Nelson, supra note 41, at 20, 23; see also Department of
Correction Security Check Log, Hospital Sit-Down Log (Sept. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Hospital Sit-Down Log] (on file with author).
43. Deposition of Shawanna Nelson, supra note 41, at 35.
44. Shawanna Nelson Grievance Statement, supra note 20, at 2.
45. Id.
46. Hospital Sit-Down Log, supra note 42.
47. WebMD, Pregnancy and the Stages of Labor and Childbirth,
http://www.webmd.com/baby/pregnancy-stages-laborpage=2 (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
48. Shawanna Nelson Grievance Statement, supra note 20, at 2; Deposition of Shawanna Nelson, supra note 41, at 43. The account of Ms. Nelson's experiences in this article is
primarily based on Ms. Nelson's own statements, but most of her account has not been directly disputed by Officer Turensky. Officer Turensky did dispute that she shackled both of
Ms. Nelson's legs to the hospital bed. Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 1:04-cv-00037-
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son experienced a labor contraction, her leg would cramp up and she would
experience severe pain.49 When the nurse wished to check how much the
cervix had dilated, Officer Turensky would remove a shackle but would
immediately reshackle Ms. Nelson once the examination was completed. 0
One of the nurses stated, in Officer Turensky's presence, that she wished
that Ms. Nelson would not be shackled. 1 While still in the labor room, with
Ms. Nelson still shackled, the nurse attempted to assist Ms. Nelson in delivering the child. 2 During the labor and delivery, Ms. Nelson suffered a hip
dislocation and an umbilical hernia.53
After Ms. Nelson had dilated to eight centimeters, the5physician arrived and asked Officer Turensky to remove the shackles.5 Officer Turensky shackled Ms. Nelson to the stretcher, and she was moved to the delivery room.55 The physician again asked that the shackles be removed.5 6 The
physician declined to provide Ms. Nelson with an epidural for the pain of
childbirth on the ground that delivery was too imminent for an epidural to
be safely provided.17 Ms. Nelson thereafter delivered a baby weighing about
nine-and-a-half pounds.5 8
After Ms. Nelson gave birth, she was reshackled to her hospital bed by
the correctional officer who replaced Officer Turensky.5 9 During the night,
when Ms. Nelson needed to relieve herself, the need to unlock the shackles,
combined with the length of time it took Ms. Nelson to move because of the
injury to her hip resulted in Ms. Nelson being unable to wait to use the restroom, and she was forced to soil herself.60 Finally, on the second night of
her hospital stay, the second correctional officer left Ms. Nelson unshackled.61
Officer Turensky provided a number of statements that appear to show
that she was aware of the substantial risk of the shackling to Ms. Nelson.
For example, Officer Turensky stated that although she had been trained
that she needed to use full restraints only on prisoners who "weren't too
JMM-JWC (E.D. Ark. June 11, 2007), Deposition of Patricia Turensky at 24 (Sept. 7, 2006)
(on file with author).
49. Shawanna Nelson Grievance Statement, supranote 20, at 2.
50. Id.
51. Id.at 43-44.
52. Hospital Sit-Down Log, supra note 42; Shawanna Nelson Grievance Statement,
supra note 20, at 2.
53. Shawanna Nelson Grievance Statement, supra note 20, at 55-56.
54. Id.at 3.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. I:04-cv-00037-JMM-JWC (E.D. Ark. June 11,
2007), Deposition of Paul J. Hegenroeder at 78-79 (May 17, 2006) (on file with author).
58. Id.at 20, 23; see also Hospital Sit-Down Log, supra note 42.
59. Hospital Sit-Down Log, supra note 42, at 3.
60. Deposition of Shawanna Nelson, supra note 41, at 46-47.
61. Id.at 47.
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crippled or pregnant to do so," she nonetheless proceeded to shackle Ms.
Nelson at a time that birth appeared imminent.6 2 Officer Turensky did not
consider Ms. Nelson to be a safety risk or an escape risk. 63 In Officer Turensky's response to Ms. Nelson's later institutional grievance about the
shackling, Officer Turensky made the puzzling statement that an"[inmate]
while pregnant does not wear shackles, chain and box for obvious medical
reasons." 64 Indeed, Officer Turensky was able to identify a few of the specific "obvious medical reasons" herself; she stated that she preferred not to
shackle pregnant women because of the danger of tripping along with the
difficulty the women face when walking in shackles.65 Officer Turensky
also volunteered that the shackles were "not very sanitary" when the pregnant woman needed to be examined.66 The only reason identified by Officer
Turensky for applying shackles to Ms. Nelson was her fear that if she did
not do so, she would violate institutional rules and be disciplined by the
warden.67
In Ms. Nelson's statement in the prison grievance system, she described the effects of the shackling as follows:
As a result, I am traumatized by this event, my hip is still very sore, and
I can only sleep on my back. It is not a day that goes by that I don't
wonder why I was treated that way. Cpl [Turensky] had her gun so, why
was I restrained? ... It is enough to be [separated] from a newborn baby,
birth totally ruins your
but to be treated like an animal while giving
68
mind.
of
state
emotional
whole mental and
Following Ms. Nelson's release from prison, she had surgery for the
hernia and later for the hip displacement, which caused her extreme pain.69
In addition, because of damage to her muscles during the delivery, Ms. Nelson was advised to avoid future childbirth. 70 Further, Ms. Nelson also presented evidence in the form of an undisputed affidavit by a Fellow of the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists that contained the
following statements:
It is my opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that it is
inherently dangerous to both the mother and the unborn fetus to have a
woman shackled during the final states of labor. During the final stages
62. Deposition of Patricia Turensky, supra note 48, at 16-17.
63. Id. at 21.
64. Shawanna Nelson Grievance Statement, supra note 20, at 5.
65. Deposition of Patricia Turensky, supra note 48, at 24.
66. Jd. at 43.
67. Id. at 24.
68. Id. at 3.
69. Deposition of Shawanna Nelson, supra note 41, at 57-58; Gathered by personal
communication from Shawanna Nelson.
70. Deposition of Shawanna Nelson, supra note 41, at 62.
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of labor, it is important to the delivering physician to be able to move
quickly and act quickly, in order to avoid potentially
71 life-threatening
emergencies for both the mother and the unborn fetus.
IV. THE LITIGATION BATTLE IN THE COURTS
A.

The District Court Proceedings

On April 15, 2004, Ms. Nelson filed suit in federal court against Correctional Medical Services (CMS), a for-profit company that, pursuant to a
contract with the Arkansas Department of Correction, provides medical care
to prisoners at the McPherson Unit.72 The complaint alleged that Ms. Nelson was shackled during labor and delivery, that since the delivery she has
needed specialty medical care, and that CMS had been "deliberately indifferent" to her medical needs.73 The complaint further alleged that Ms. Nelson,
who was still incarcerated at the time of filing, had exhausted her administrative remedies, a requirement imposed on prisoners seeking to challenge
their conditions of confinement in federal court by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act.74 An amended complaint, filed on June 1, 2004, added as defendants the medical director of the Arkansas Department of Correction,
some unidentified nurses whose names were unknown to Ms. Nelson, the
Director of the Department of Correction, and Officer Turensky.7 5
Various pre-trial skirmishes resulted in the dismissal of the claims
against the unnamed nurses, 76 as well as the dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief, since Ms. Nelson had been released from prison after the
filing of the complaint.7 7 At that point, the various state defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment against Ms. Nelson,78 and CMS filed its own
summary judgment motion.79 On June 11, 2007, the district court adopted
71. Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 1:04-cv-00037-JMM-JWC (E.D. Ark. June 11,
2007), Affidavit of Cynthia Frazier, M.D. at 1 (Jan. 3, 2007).
72. Complaint at 1, Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. l:04-cv-00037-JMM-JWC (E.D.
Ark. June 11, 2007).
73. Id. at 2-3. Officials who know of and disregard an excessive risk to prisoner health
or safety are "deliberately indifferent" and thereby violate the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2009).
75. Amended Complaint at 3-5, Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 1:04-cv-00037-JMMJWC (E.D. Ark. June 11, 2007).
76. Proposed Findings and Recommended Partial Disposition at 6, Nelson v. Corr. Med.
Servs., No. 1:04-cv-00037-JMM-JWC (E.D. Ark. June 11,2007).
77. Id. at 6-8.
78. Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Arkansas Department of Correction,
Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 1:04-cv-00037-JMM-JWC (E.D. Ark. June 11, 2007).
79. Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Correctional Medical Services, Nelson
v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 1:04-cv-00037-JMM-JWC (E.D. Ark. June 11, 2007).
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the findings and recommendation of the magistrate judge. 80 The court ordered that certain claims related to alleged retaliation by Officer Turensky
be dismissed because Ms. Nelson failed to exhaust these claims administratively by filing appeals on these issues to the final stage of the internal prison grievance system. 81 The district judge also adopted the recommendation
of the magistrate judge that the claims against CMS and the medical director be dismissed with prejudice, on the ground that Ms. Nelson had offered
no evidence demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the CMS policy, allegedly adopted by the medical director, regarding monitoring of women in
labor and, in particular, the policy of not transporting such women to the
hospital until their contractions were occurring at intervals of five minutes
or less.82
At the same time, the court refused to dismiss the claims of Ms. Nelson
against Officer Turensky and Department of Correction Director Norris
related to her shackling during labor until she was actually in the delivery
room. 83 The most important ruling of the district court was its adoption of
the magistrate judge's rejection of the asserted defense of qualified immunity. 84 If the defendants had qualified immunity, Ms. Nelson would have lost
the case even if she were to have ultimately established that the defendants
had violated her constitutional rights.8 5 Indeed, the defense of qualified immunity is powerful because denial of a public official's asserted defense of
qualified immunity frequently, as in this case, allows the defendant the opportunity to appeal from the rejection of qualified immunity, despite the
general rule that an order simply requiring a matter to proceed to trial is not
appealable until after the entry of final judgment. 86 In this case, defendants
Turensky and Norris decided to immediately test the district court's conclusion that a reasonable jury could find them liable for the injuries suffered by
Ms. Nelson, and the defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity to
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.87
80. Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. l:04-cv-00037-JMM-JWC (E.D. Ark. June 11,
2007), rev 'd in part, 533 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2008), aff'd in part,rev 'd in part, 583 F.3d 522
(8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
81. Id. at *6.
82. Id. at*10&n.8.
83. Id. at*10.
84. Id. at *11.
85. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that government
officials performing discretionary functions are generally not liable for violations of civil
rights unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.").
86. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-27 (1985) (holding that a defendant
official aggrieved by a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity on the basis of
an issue of law may file an immediate appeal of that order despite the ordinary rule barring
interlocutory appeals because qualified immunity entails a right not to be required to stand
trial unless the violation of law is clearly established).
87. See Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 533 F.3d 958 (8th
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The Panel Decision

On July 18, 2008, the panel issued its decision reversing the district
court and remanding for dismissal of the complaint.88 At the time that the
panel issued its decision, a federal court considering an issue of qualified
immunity was required to first determine whether the conduct that was the
subject of the plaintiffs claim stated a violation of law. 9
The panel accordingly began by considering whether plaintiff s allegations stated a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 90 In determining whether
prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment, the court must determine,
under Farmerv. Brennan,9 1 whether the conditions of confinement posed an
excessive risk of substantial harm 92 and also whether the prison officials
possessed actual knowledge of that excessive risk. 93 The appellate panel
agreed that Ms. Nelson suffered from a serious medical condition,9 4 but the
panel found no evidence that either defendant Norris, the Director of the
Arkansas Department of Correction,9 5or defendant Turensky "deliberately
disregarded Nelson's medical needs."
In addition, the panel applied another test, derived from its previous
decision in Haslarv. Megerman,96 to determine that defendants were not in
violation of the Constitution. Haslar, although it post-dated the Supreme
Court's seminal decision in Farmer v. Brennan,97 looked at the issue of
shackling the jail detainee plaintiff while he was hospitalized as an issue of
the permissible uses of physical force to prevent escape, rather than a question of the extent to which jail officials violated their duty to supply necessary medical care to detainees. Haslar involved a jail detainee who, while
virtually comatose, had his legs shackled to a hospital bed. 9 The detainee's

Cir. 2008).
88. Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs. (Nelson 1), 533 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 583
F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
89. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), recededfrom by, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009). Since the time of the panel decision, the Supreme Court
decided in Pearson v. Callahan that federal courts need not always first decide the question
of the existence of a violation of law before the court decides the question of qualified immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
90. Nelson 1, 533 F.3d at 962.
91. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
92. The Court characterized this determination as the objective component of a conditions of confinement violation. Id. at 837.
93. This knowledge was characterized by the Court as the subjective component of an
Eighth Amendment violation. Id.at 837.
94. Nelson 1,533 F.3d at 962.
95. Id.at 963.
96. 104 F.3d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1997).
97. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
98. Haslar, 104 F.3d at 179.
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medical problems caused his legs to swell substantially.9 9 Despite the detainee's complaints that the shackles were hurting him, the correctional officers guarding him neither checked the shackles nor asked a nurse to examine
him. 00 As a result, the detainee suffered permanent leg damage and pain. 10'
Significantly, the actions of the correctional officers were inconsistent with
asserted jail practices; ordinarily, a correctional officer would check the
shackles,
or ask a nurse to do so, if a detainee complained that they were too
02
tight.

Unfortunately, the detainee sued only the County and the director of
the Department of Corrections, alleging that these defendants had been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and had imposed punishment
barred by the Constitution. 0 3 The court, applying the Supreme Court's
holding in Bell v. Wolfish, a jail conditions of confinement case, decided
that the unwritten "policy"''1 4 of the county did not impose punishment because it lacked an express intent to punish, and the court could not infer an
intent to punish unless the policy "is either unrelated to a legitimate penological goal or excessive in relation to that goal."'1 5 The court concluded
that shackling hospitalized detainees, as part of an unwritten policy that
included safeguards to attempt to ensure that detainees were not accidentally injured by the shackles, satisfied the Due Process standard applicable to
jail detainees 0 6 by serving the legitimate penological goal of preventing
escape:
A single armed guard often cannot prevent a determined, unrestrained,
and sometimes aggressive inmate from escaping without resorting to
force. It is eminently reasonable to prevent escape attempts at the outset
by restraining hospitalized inmates to their beds, and the policy provides
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The detainee was being held in the jail prior to trial for a criminal offense. In Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Supreme Court held that pre-trial detainees' rights are
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and
that conditions of confinement imposed on pre-trial detainees violate the Due Process Clause
if they amount to the imposition of punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. Haslar cites Bell for
this point. Haslar,104 F.3d at 180 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 535). Notwithstanding the different sources of the constitutional protections of convicted prisoners and jail detainees, many
federal courts apply the same substantive standards to conditions of confinement claims filed
by prisoners (governed by the Eighth Amendment) and conditions of confinement claims
filed by jail detainees (governed by the Due Process Clause). See, e.g., Natale v. Camden
County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581-82 (3d Cir. 2003); Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490,
495 (10th Cir. 1998); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11 th Cir. 1996).
104. Haslar,104 F.3d at 180. In context, the reference to "policy" in the opinion refers to
the asserted practice or custom of the jail staff. See id. at 179.
105. Haslar,104 F.3d at 180 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538).
106. See supra note 103.
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for exigencies such as Haslar's by requiring the guards, upon a doctor's
request, to request permission from the shift administrator at the jail to
replace the shackles with another means of restraint. The Constitution,
moreover, does not require that governmental action be the only
alterna07
tive, or even the best alternative, in order to be constitutional.1
Thus, Haslarand the panel opinion in Nelson I deal with an important
issue related to constitutional challenges to prison and jail conditions of
confinement. Constitutional challenges to the quality of medical care required for prisoners are generally considered not to involve weighing of
possible security concerns because "the State's responsibility to attend to
the medical needs of prisoners does not ordinarily clash with other equally
important governmental responsibilities."'' 0 8 Shackling prisoners transported
outside of a prison for medical care who are also particularly vulnerable to
medical harm by reason of those shackles is, however, an obvious example
of a situation in which the need of the prisoner to be protected from medical
harm is in potential tension with the need of prison authorities to prevent
escape.
The court in Nelson I addressed this issue by applying both the Farmer
"deliberate indifference" standard' 0 9 and the Bell test of whether the shackling imposed "punishment."' 10 There is, however, a significant question of
whether the Bell "punishment" standard applies in this situation. As noted
above, the Bell standard requires that a court consider whether a practice is
unrelated to a legitimate penological goal or excessive in relation to that
goal."' That standard is in many ways a stripped-down version of the standard established in yet another Supreme Court case, Turner v. Safley,"2
which governs most constitutional interests possessed by prisoners, such as
First Amendment and privacy interests. 1 3 The Turner standard establishes a
four-part test, as follows:
[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.... First, there must be a "valid, rational connection" between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. Thus, a regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote
as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational ....
A second factor relevant in determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction . . . is
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
many).

Haslar, 104 F.3d at 180 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 542-43 n.25).
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
See supranote 73 and accompanying text.
See supranote 103 and accompanying text.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 538.
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
See id. at 91, 94-95 (applying test to prisoner correspondence and to the right to
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449.

whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain
open to prison inmates.... A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and
other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally....
Finally, the absence of ready
alternatives is evidence of the reasonable14
ness of a prison regulation.1
The problem in the Haslarcourt's application of the Bell test is that the
Supreme Court, after Haslar, explicitly rejected the application of the related Turner standard to Eighth Amendment claims.11 5 Thus, while there are
other, more obvious ways to distinguish the circumstances in Haslar from
the circumstances in Nelson," 6 there are substantial reasons to question
whether the Bell punishment standard as used in Haslarremains good law.
Accordingly, the background issues in Nelson involve one of the most
significant Eighth Amendment issues on which the Supreme Court has yet
to provide clear guidance-the issue of the extent to which, if at all, prison
officials should be able to justify conditions of confinement that would otherwise violate the Eighth Amendment when the conditions serve an actual
security need.
C.

The En Banc Eighth Circuit Decision

Ms. Nelson filed a petition for rehearing addressed to the full Eighth
Circuit, which the court of appeals granted. The decision provided the court
with an opportunity to clarify the law regarding the relationship between
proffered security justifications for actions that would otherwise violate
Farmer's standard for judging Eighth Amendment challenges to conditions
of confinement. At a minimum, the court seemed destined to be the first to
address the issue of shackling a prisoner during labor and childbirth, on a
record that included evidence of a substantial risk to the prisoner and fetus
from the shackling, as well as evidence of the correctional officer's knowledge of that risk.
On October 2, 2009, the sharply-divided en banc court issued its opinion. All members of the court agreed that Larry Norris, the Director of the
Department of Correction, could not be held liable for his role in formulating the discretionary policy that led Officer Turensky to use shackles on Ms.
Nelson. The six-member majority of the court, however, reversed the panel
and held that the district court appropriately allowed Ms. Nelson's case to
114. Id. at 89-91 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 551).
115. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005). "We judge violations of [the
Eighth] Amendment under the 'deliberate indifference' standard, rather than Turner's 'reasonably related' standard." Id. (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)).
116. For example, Ms. Nelson, unlike the plaintiff in Haslar,actually sued the correctional officer who was responsible for the shackling that caused her injuries.
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proceed to trial against Officer Turensky, concluding that a reasonable jury
could find that Officer Turensky's conduct violated the Eighth Amendment
and that Officer Turensky was not17 entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
her qualified immunity defense.
1. The Eighth Amendment Standard
The most important analytic choice made by the six-member majority
was their decision to treat this case as one raising solely a conditions of confinement claim'18 and consider the implicit question of a security justification for shackles simply as an issue that could limit the scope of the court's
decision, rather than a justification for applying a separate standard. The
court discussed the asserted security interest in shackling Ms. Nelson directly but briefly:
While "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury
can typically be established or disproved without the necessity of balancing competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff,"
from the record evidence in Nelson's case there does not even appear to
have been a competing penological interest in shackling her....
A reasonable factfinder could determine from the record evidence that
Nelson did not present a flight risk while under the supervision of Turensky, an experienced correctional officer who was equipped with a fire
119
arm.
Of note, the dissent does not argue that Haslar allows the court to reject Ms. Nelson's Eighth Amendment claim unless the court finds that the
actions of Officer Turensky imposed punishment. The dissent does cite
Haslarfor the claim that a single armed correctional officer cannot prevent
an escape without using force and it notes that the detainee in Haslar was
virtually comatose. 120 The implicit corollary of the dissent's approach is that
any shackling policy related to prisoners undergoing labor in an outside
facility is constitutional on its face, at least if, like the policies in Haslarand
Nelson, the policy provides some safeguards against injury, such as a provision that a medical request to stop the shackling of a particular prisoner
would be considered by correctional staff.12 1 One response to the dissent
117. Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs. (Nelson 1), 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
118. See id. at 528 (stating that the court is applying the Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement standard of "deliberate indifference" from Farmer rather than the Eighth
Amendment use of force standard applicable to prison riots from Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 320-21 (1986)).
119. Id. at 530-31 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 541 (citing Haslar, 104 F.3d at 180) (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissent-

ing in part).

121. Nelson II, 583 F.3d at 533 (describing written policy related to shackling); see Has-
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might have been that in neither Haslarnor Nelson was there a penological
would have justified a correctional officer in shackling the
interest that
22
plaintiff. 1
The majority then had a rather easy time finding that Ms. Nelson had
presented enough evidence on both the objective and subjective prongs of
the FarmerEighth Amendment standard to proceed to trial. The objective
component of Farmer,involving a showing of an excessive risk of substantial harm, 123 was satisfied by the affidavit of the physician who stated that it
is always dangerous to shackle a woman during the final stages of labor.124
Ms. Nelson similarly satisfied the subjective component of the Farmer
Eighth Amendment standard, requiring evidence that a defendant understood the risk created by his or her actions, by providing Officer Turensky's
statements, which could be read to show actual knowledge of the risk to Ms.
Nelson.1 5 The court also noted that Officer Turensky had been present
while the nurses were attempting to help Ms. Nelson push her baby through
personnel had repeatedly asked that the
the birth canal and that
26 medical
1
removed.
be
shackles
The dissent's response to the majority's conclusion that Ms. Nelson
was entitled to have a jury decide whether Officer Turensky had actual
knowledge of the excessive risk to Ms. Nelson was to cite other facts in the
record that could show that Officer Turensky did not comprehend the actual
risk.127 The dissent pointed to other statements in Officer Turensky's deposition in which she contradicts her own testimony and ambiguously expresses
doubts about whether Ms. Nelson was a flight risk.' 28 In response to questions from Officer Turensky's counsel, she stated that she was "a tad nervous" because she was unaware of any information about Ms. Nelson's crime
or background. 129 The dissent makes no attempt to evaluate the consistency
of these statements with Officer Turensky's other statements that she did
lar, 104 F.3d at 179 (describing unwritten policy at issue).
122. Of course, it is important to remember that the correctional officers responsible for
the shackling in Haslarwere not in fact defendants. Haslar, 104 F.3d at 179-80.
123. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 823, 837 (1994).
124. Nelson II, 583 F.3d at 529 (citing Affidavit of Cynthia Frazier, M.D., supra note
71).
125. Nelson I, 583 F.3d at 529.
126. Id. at 530.
127. Id. at 541 (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128. Id. The actual exchange in the deposition is as follows:
"Q: At any time, did you feel that Ms. Nelson was a flight risk?
A: I had my doubts, yes, ma'am.
Q: Tell me about that.
A: Because I did not know what her crime was and the way that was talking
about how she should not be considered an inmate because she was in the free
world in a free-world hospital. This made me a tad nervous."
Deposition of Patricia Turensky, supra note 48, at 26-27.
129. See Deposition of Patricia Turensky, supra note 48.
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not view Ms. Nelson as a flight risk or a safety risk. 130 Similarly, the dissent
views the evidence that Officer Turensky removed the shackles when asked
to do so by hospital medical personnel as evidence that Officer Turensky
did not think she was exposing Ms. Nelson and her soon-to-be-born child to
danger.' 3' Another view of this evidence, as the majority opinion implicitly
notes, is that Officer Turensky continued to reattach the shackles even
though medical personnel continued to ask for their removal. 32 The dissent
also argues that because Ms. Nelson did not challenge the actions of the
medical staff at the hospital, the majority was holding a correctional officer
to a higher standard than medical personnel in recognizing a danger to Ms.
Nelson. 133 Again, however, another view of this record is that medical staff
never suggested the shackling and in fact, did everything they thought they
could to stop it. 134 Indeed, one of the nurses told Ms. Nelson that she wished
Ms. Nelson would not be shackled. 135 As such, one could read the dissent as
analyzing only whether a reasonable fact-finder could find that Officer Turensky did not have actual knowledge of the unreasonable risk to Ms. Nelson; the dissent does not attempt to refute the majority's reasoning that evidence in the record would allow a reasonable fact-finder to reach the opposite conclusion and decide that Officer Turensky did have such knowledge.
One way of looking at the difference between the view of the majority
and the dissent with regard to whether Ms. Nelson demonstrated sufficient
evidence of a constitutional violation to preclude summary judgment is to
consider whether these differences in fact reflect the experience and values
that the judges bring to their task. The importance of such considerations is
illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Harris.136 That case
involved a high-speed police chase that began when police saw a speeding
automobile and ended when police rammed the car, causing a crash that left
the fleeing driver a quadriplegic. 13 On an interlocutory appeal of the denial
of qualified immunity to the defendants, 38 the Supreme Court, with Justice
Stevens dissenting, held that the defendants should have been granted summary judgment on the ground that no reasonable jury could find a constitutional violation in the conduct of the police officers. 139 In doing so, the majority relied almost exclusively on its own sensory conclusions drawn from
130.
part).
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Nelson II, 583 F.3d at 540-41 (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
Id. at 541 (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 530 (Murphy, J.).
Id. at 541-42 (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 530 (Murphy, J.).
Deposition of Shawanna Nelson, supra note 41, at 43-44.
550 U.S. 372 (2007).
Id. at 374-75.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 386.
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453

seeing a videotape, stating that "it is clear from the videotape that [the plaintiff] posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who
might have been present, to other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase."' 4 ° Justice Stevens viewed the videotape quite differently, concluding that a jury could find that the chase exposed motorists to
no greater
risk than the risk motorists encounter with a speeding ambul14 1
ance.
Thus Scott poses an interesting question of the wisdom of a judicial
holding, in the course of granting summary judgment, that no reasonable
juror could reach a conclusion different from that of the judge. Three law
school professors chose to explore this question by showing the same videotape that the Supreme Court justices saw to a diverse sample of 1350 Americans. 142 The professors collected data related to the individual characteristics of the viewers, dividing them into categories based on demographic
characteristics including race, gender, income, and residence in rural or urban areas. 143 The authors discovered that seventy-five percent of those participating in the survey agreed that the police were justified in using deadly
force against the plaintiff and twenty-six percent disagreed.' 44 Aside from
the question of whether these statistics directly undermine the Supreme
Court's claim that "no reasonable juror" could fail to find the use of deadly
force justified, the survey also found that African-Americans, low-income
workers, survey participants from the Northeast, persons who characterized
themselves as liberals, and Democrats tended to end up with views on the
videotape that were more favorable to the plaintiff than did the majority of
the Supreme Court:
Individuals with these characteristics tend to share a cultural orientation
that prizes egalitarianism and social solidarity. Various highly salient,
"symbolic" political issues-from gun control to affirmative action,
from the death penalty to environmental protection-feature conflict between persons who share this recognizable cultural profile and those
who hold an opposing one that features hierarchical and individualistic
values. We found that persons who subscribed to the former style tended
to perceive less danger in [the plaintiffs] flight, to attribute more re140. Id. at 384.
141. Id.at 391 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also points to specific points at
which he believes the majority drew debatable inferences from the videotape, including his
suggestion that the motorists seen pulling over on the videotape did so because the drivers
heard sirens or saw flashing lights rather than as a result of being forced off the road by the
plaintiff. Id.
142. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perilsof Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REv. 837,
838 (2009).
143. Id.at 859.
144. Id at 866. At the same time, forty-five percent agreed at least slightly with the conclusion that the chase was not worth the risk. Id. at 865.
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sponsibility to the police for creating the risk for the public, and to find
less justification in the use of deadly force to end the chase. Indeed,
these individuals were much more likely to see the police, rather than
[the plaintiff], as the source of the danger posed by the flight and to find
of [the plaintiffs] vehicle unnecessary to avert
the deliberate ramming
45
risk to the public.1
The issues in the Nelson case seem tailor-made for mapping in the categories of the authors, with the interests of prisoners, women, civil rights
plaintiffs, and African-Americans 146 versus prison staff, and those who have
generally conservative views with respect to civil rights claims, or claims on
behalf of women or African-Americans. It is therefore interesting that all
eleven judges on the en banc court decided the Eighth Amendment issue in
favor of the same party that the judge concluded should prevail on the qualified immunity issue. While it would be clearly unjustified to suggest that
any member of the en banc court was influenced in either direction by such
considerations, the law professors who conducted the study of reactions to
the videotape are surely correct that "[fjacts 'speak for themselves' only
against the background of preexisting understandings of social reality that
invest those facts with meaning."'' 47 For that reason, as the authors argue,
judges should be particularly alert to the need to exercise restraint when
they are inclined to decide that a case should not be allowed to proceed to a
jury trial, particularly when the judge can foresee that others with recognizable identity-defining characteristics-either inherent or ideologicalwould be likely to perceive an "exclusionary message" in having their sta48
tistically-likely views defined as ones that no reasonable juror could hold.
2. The Rejection of QualifiedImmunity
The section of the majority opinion rejecting Officer Turensky's defense of qualified immunity began with a recitation of some general principles governing the application of the defense. A public official will not
have such a defense if the official's actions violated a "clearly established"
constitutional right. 14 9 There need not be a case with materially or fundamentally similar facts in order for a constitutional right to be "clearly established.' 50 Indeed, "officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates
145. Id.
at 841 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
146. Possibly because Shawanna is similar to Shawna, a common African-American
name, in the author's experience many people assume that Ms. Nelson is African-American
before meeting her. See African American Baby Names Dictionary-Letter S,
http://www.babynames.org.uk/affican-american-names-list-s.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
147. Kahan et al., supra note 142, at 883.
148. Id. at 898-99.
149. Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 527 (2009) (en banc).
at531.
150. Id.
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established law even in novel factual circumstances."' 151 In addition, a court

can find that a defendant had notice of the "clearly established" law through
15 2
the Constitution itself, or through decisions of the lower federal courts.
The majority relied on several cases to hold that the law is "clearly established." The first was Hope v. Pelzer,5'" in which the Supreme Court
held that the practice of handcuffing prisoners to an outside hitching post, in
the absence of an emergency situation, when the restraint created a danger
of particular pain and humiliation, violated the Eighth Amendment. 154 The
majority also relied upon Estelle v. Gamble, 155 in which the Supreme Court
held that prisoners challenging a failure to provide medical care as a violation of the Eighth Amendment must demonstrate that defendant prison staff
were "deliberately indifferent" to serious medical needs, 156 as well as Farmer v. Brennan,157 in which the Court defined the "deliberate indifference"
standard as involving situations in which the prison official acts or fails to
act despite knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. 158 The court of
appeals also cited two of its own cases applying Farmerto hold that a trier
of fact could find an Eighth Amendment violation based on evidence that
prison officials had ignored an "obvious" risk to a prisoner related to a serious medical need. 159 Finally, the majority cited Women Prisoners of District of Columbia Department of Corrections v. District of Columbia, in
which the district court found that
shackling a woman prisoner during labor
1 60
violated the Eighth Amendment.
The dog that does not bark in the discussion of whether the law was
clearly established that Ms. Nelson's treatment violated the Eighth Amendment is Miller v. Shoenen.161 In that case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an interlocutory appeal based on an asserted defense of qualified immunity by prison doctors where a prisoner alleged that prison doctors had denied him medical care that he required as a result of his previous
151. Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
152. Id. (citations omitted).
153. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
154. Id. at 738.
155. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
156. Id. at 104-05.
157. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
158. Id.at 842.
159. Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs. (Nelson I1), 583 F.3d 522, 532 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(citing Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2001); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d
778, 786 (8th Cir. 1997)). Farmer states that a fact finder may conclude that a prison official
had actual knowledge of a risk on the basis of circumstantial evidence, such as the fact that a
risk is obvious. Farmer,511 U.S. at 842.
160. Nelson II, 583 F.3d at 532-33 (citing Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v.
District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 668-69 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part & modified
in part on other grounds, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995), remanded,93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir.
1996)).
161. 75 F.3d 1305 (8th Cir. 1996).
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heart transplant. 162 The district court held that the physicians were not entitled to qualified immunity, 163 and the court of appeals affirmed the denial
of immunity because it concluded the plaintiff had introduced sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the plaintiff had serious medical
needs and that defendants knew of these needs but failed to provide adequate treatment.164 In short, the court of appeals applied the same Farmer
standard, used for determining whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the underlying Eighth Amendment issue, to the question
of qualified immunity, suggesting that whenever a plaintiff successfully
proves a Farmer Eighth Amendment claim involving medical care, the
plaintiff has also proven all that is necessary to defeat qualified immunity.
Possibly the reason that the Nelson court of appeals was hesitant to rely
on Miller was the Supreme Court's later decision in Saucier v. Katz' 65 regarding qualified immunity. In Saucier, the Court held, in the context of a
Fourth Amendment claim alleging that a police officer had used excessive
force, that the inquiry into whether a reasonable jury could find a violation
of the Fourth Amendment was logically distinct from the inquiry as to
whether the law was clearly established that the officer's conduct was unconstitutional, so as to deprive the officer of the defense of qualified immunity. 166
This is in some ways a difficult distinction to understand because in the
context of Saucier the applicable constitutional standard required the plain167
tiff to prove that the officer's use of force was objectively unreasonable.
This inquiry on its face seems quite similar to an inquiry into whether the
law was clearly established that the officer's conduct was prohibited. The
Supreme Court, however, concluded that judicial decisions will not always
give a clear answer as to whether a use of force will be determined excessive in a particular factual circumstance, and in such circumstances, the law
cannot be said to be "clearly established" so as to deprive a defendant of
qualified immunity. 68 The danger in such an approach is that if a federal
court applies Saucier to allow defendants to claim qualified immunity when
their conduct does not significantly differ from previous conduct held to
constitute deliberate indifference, defendants who are deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk of harm to a prisoner, but with a type of harm or
degree of risk slightly different from any previous successful case, will
avoid liability for the resulting constitutional violation. Many precedents
162.
163.
164.
165.
(2009).
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 1307.
Id.
Id. at 1310-11.
533 U.S. 194 (2001), receded from by, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818
Id. at 203-05.
Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)).
Id. at 205-06.
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from the United States Supreme Court, such as Saucier, support an analysis
that requires great factual similarity with previous cases to defeat qualified
immunity, 169 but other Supreme Court precedents, like Hope'7" and other
cases cited by the majority in Nelson II, appear far less demanding. Federal
judges, in fact, apparently have a great deal of latitude in the application of
the defense.
Two relatively minor points about the qualified immunity discussions
in Nelson I also warrant some discussion. The strongest argument of the
dissent is its objection that the majority cites only Women Prisoners171 as
existing precedent holding that shackling a woman prisoner during labor
violates the Constitution. On its own, without Hope and the Eighth Circuit
precedents cited by the majority, the dissent's argument might well be persuasive. The factual circumstances in Hope were, however, in many respects parallel to those in Nelson II, and to some extent there was less justification for the restraints and more risk of harm to the prisoner in Nelson II
than in Hope. Both cases involved the use of mechanical restraints to attach
a prisoner to a stationary object while the prisoner was outside the prison;
both cases involved a situation in which the use of restraints posed a serious
risk to both the physical health of the prisoner and to the prisoner's dignity.
Neither case involved a claim of an emergency security need for restraining
the prisoner to a stationary object. Indeed, the risk of harm from restraining
both legs of a woman in labor seems intrinsically greater than the risk inherent in handcuffing a prisoner to a hitching post who has no known special
medical contra-indications to such treatment.
Further, unlike the factual setting in Hope, in which the prisoner had
172
previously been involved in disciplinary issues while outside the prison,
the record does not remotely suggest that Ms. Nelson had a similar disciplinary history. The Supreme Court suggested in Hope that, even without any
previous decisions condemning the attachment of a non-protesting prisoner
to a stationary object in a manner that posed a significant risk of harm to
that prisoner, it might still have found that the law was "clearly established"
that such conduct violated the Eighth Amendment.1 73 Given this, the court
of appeals in Nelson If would have been justified in denying qualified immunity even if Women Prisonershad never been decided.
Finally, the majority opinion vigorously argues that the correctional officer's actions were unsupported by Arkansas Department of Correction's
policy, while the dissent just as vigorously argues that the officer acted in a
169. See Saucier, 533 U.S. 194.
170. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
171. Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634,

668-69 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part & modified in part on other grounds, 899 F. Supp.
659 (D.D.C. 1995), remanded,93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
172. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 734-35.
173. Id. at 741.
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manner consistent with the policy. 174 It is not clear why this issue seemed of
great significance to members of the en banc court. The Supreme Court case
that is most closely on point to the issues in Nelson II is, as discussed above,
Hope v. Pelzer.175 At issue in Hope was a formal policy of the Alabama
Department of Corrections that allowed use of the hitching post.' 76 Significantly, in Hope, the Supreme Court held that the officers who were involved
in the hitching post lacked qualified immunity 177 even though the Court also
affirmed the determination of the Eleventh Circuit that "the policy and practice of cuffing an inmate to a hitching post or similar stationary object for a
period of time that surpasses that necessary
to quell a threat or restore order
178
is a violation of the Eighth Amendment."'
V. BEYOND NELSONH

The Eighth Circuit en banc decision in Nelson H represents an extraordinarily important precedent for women prisoners who face the physical
risks and inherent indignities of being forced to labor and give birth in
chains. At the same time, the case raises even more questions than it answers: What about preventive measures taken against a prisoner who does
pose a risk of escape or some other security threat but who is also at extreme risk of harm from these measures? This situation does not fall neatly
into the Fanner"deliberate indifference" standard for failure to respond to
known medical risks 17 9 nor the Whitley v. Albers "malicious and sadistic"
standard that applies to claims that a correctional officer used excessive
force in an emergency situation when the use of some force was appropriate. 180 What policies should a Department of Correction promulgate to assure that correctional officers have appropriate guidance on the issue of the
use of mechanical restraints on prisoners with a variety of health needs, in a
broad spectrum of factual settings, particularly when, as Ms. Nelson's experience shows, it is not safe to assume that a physician will be available to
provide guidance to the officer? Finally, Nelson II raises critical issues that
go far beyond the prison context of the case itself regarding the degree of
specificity required in previous decisions for the law to be "clearly estab174. Compare Nelson 11, 583 F.3d at 533, with Nelson II, 583 F.3d at 540 (Riley, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. Hope, 536 U.S. at 730.
176. Id. at744-45.
177. Id. at 745-46.
178. Id. at 736 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 980-81 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added)); see also Hope, 536 U.S. at 747 (stating that the Supreme Court's decision that
the act of cuffing a prisoner to a hitching post in a non-emergency situation violates the
Eighth Amendment "adequately rests on the same assumption that sufficed for the Court of
Appeals.").
179. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
180. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).

2010]

CHAINING WOMEN PRISONERS

459

lished" and the degree to which federal judges should be reluctant to take
factual issues from a jury when those issues are embedded in a case raising
claims that are ideologically controversial.

